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DEFEASIBLE REASONING, SPECIAL PLEADING
AND THE COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT:
A REPLY TO OPPY
Robert C. Koons

This is a reply to a paper by Graham Oppy in the July, 1999 issue of this
journal, "Koons' Cosmological Argument." Recent work in defeasible or
nonmonotonic logic means that the cosmological argument can be cast in
such a way that it does not presuppose that every contingent situation,
without exception, has a cause. Instead, the burden of proof is shifted to the
skeptic, who must produce positive reasons for thinking that the cosmos is
an exception to the defeasible law of causality. I show how Oppy's critique
can be turned into a plausible rebuttal of my argument. However, this
rebuttal can be set aside when the original argument is supplemented by a
plausible account of the nature of causal priority. Several independent lines
of argument in support of this account are outlined.

Introduction
In "Koons' Cosmological Argument,"l Graham Oppy offered a single criticism to the main argument of my 1997 paper, "A New Look at the
Cosmological Argument."2 In this main argument, I sought to demonstrate
the existence of a necessary situation which is the uncaused cause of a11
who11y contingent situations. In addition, Oppy posed a number of objections to what I called "plausible corollaries" to my principal theoren1,
including the existence of a necessary being a11 of whose attributes
are immeasurably great. Finally, Oppy suggested that the usual Humean
objections to the design argument still stand, despite my argument that the
design argument is greatly strengthened by the prior success of the cosmological argument.
In this paper, I will focus almost a11 of my attention on Oppy's simple
objection to my main argument. I will clear up a few misunderstandings
which account, I think, for Oppy's failing to see the force of several of my
arguments for my corollaries. One should bear in mind, however, that my
claims concerning these arguments in the 1997 paper were quite modest: I
ca11ed the arguments "plausible inferences", by which I meant that they
provided prima facie but defeasible reasons for adopting the corollaries as
our best available conjectures about the nature of the First Cause. I did not
intend for them to be taken as apodeictic (deductively valid) in character,
much less as involving principles that are necessary, apriori and exceptionless, as Oppy seems to have interpreted them. 3
FAITH AND PHILOSOPHY
Val. 18 No. 2 April 2001
All rights reserved

192

~

..

193

THE COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT

In addition, I will have little to say here about the design argument or
the many-worlds hypothesis. My original paper was concemed with the
cosmological argument: there was scope neither in that paper nor in this
one for an all-out defense of the design argument. My poin.t in the 1997
paper was simply to argue that the conclusion of the cosmological argument enables the theist to tun1. aside two standard objections to the design
argument, namely, the threat of an infinite regress of designers, and the
weakness of an argument from analogy to human artifacts. Oppy does not
dispute either of these points, choosing instead to reiterate a long list of
standard objections, almost all deriving from Hume's Dialogues Concerning
Natural Religion. Needless to say, I find none of these objections persuasive, bl,ü this particular debate must be taken up at some later date.

A Brief Sketch ofmy Cosmological Argument
The formal framework I employed in A New Look at the Cosmological
Argument" was a modal logic supplen1ented by the LesniewskiGoodman-Leonard calculus of iI1.dividuals ("mereology")..4 By way of
modallogic, I needed only the axioms and rules of T. I used the two usual
predicate symbols of mereology, ~ and 0, representing part-of and overlap, respectively. I needed three mereological axioms:
11

Axiom 1 x~y H 'v'z(zOx ~ zOy)

Axiom 2 ::Jx(jJ(x)~::Jy'v'Z(ZOYH ::Ju((jJ(u)&uOz))
Axiom 3 x =Y H

(x ~ Y & Y ~ x)

Axiom 1 defines the part-of relation in terms of overlap, and Axiom 2 is
an aggregation or fusion principle: if there are any situations of type (jJ,
tl1.en there is an aggregate or sum of all the (jJ situations. Axiom 3 guarantees that the part-of relation is reflexive and anti-symmetric.
There were two principles linking the modal and mereologicallanguages. Here I needed to introduce a new predicate, A. Where b is a possible situation, Ab can be used to state that b actually obtains.
Axiom 4 x~y ~D (Ay ~Ax)
Axiom 5 D ('v'y

E

F Ay ~A xF.)

Axiom 4 ensures that aggregation of situations is a form of conjunction: a
whole necessitates all of its parts. Conversely, 5 implies that the existence of all
the members of a sUfi necessitates the existence of the sum itself. (In A New
Look," I inadvertantly omitted Axiom 5, which is needed in proving Lemma
2[3, p. 198] but which clearly fits the intended interpretation of aggregation.)
11
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There is one special notion that had to be defined: that of being "wholly
contingent", represented by 'V'.
Definition Vx H

(Ax & '\Iy (y ~ x ~-D Ay))

A wholly contingent situation is an actual situation none of whose parts
are necessary.
Finally, I needed only three facts about causation:
Axiom 6 (Veridicality) (x > y)

~

(Ax & Ay)

Axiom 7 (Separate Existence) (x > y) ~--,(x 0 y)
Axiom 8 (Universality) '\Ix (V x ~jy (y > x))
Axiom 6 stipulates that only actual situations can serve as causes or
effects. Axiom 7 is intended to capture Hl-lme'S insight that a cause and its
effect must be "separate existences". The language of mereology, when
applied to situations, enables us to state Hume's principle precisely: a cause
must not overlap its effect. It is very important to bear in mind th.at Axiom 6
does not require that a cause must not overlap its effect in space or time: it
is only mereological overlap (the having of a common part) that is ruled out.
Axiom 8 expresses the universality of the causal relation: every wholly contingent situation has a cause. Axiom 8 does not entail determinism, in any
of its usual senses, since I have not stated that causes are sufficient cOl1.ditions for their effects. I do not assurne that every event is necessitated by its
causes; in fact, I believe that this is not typicallY the case. For this reason,
this account of causation is compatible with indeterministic theories of
human freedom and indeterministic interpretations of quantum mechamcs.
In A New Look at the Cosmological Argument", I used these axioms
to prove the following theorem:
11

Theorem 1
If there are any contingent situations, then the cosmos (the sum of all
wholly contingent situations) has a cause that is a necessary situation.
Since we know that there is at least one contingent situation, we can use
Theorem 1 to conclude that the cosmos has a cause that is a necessary situation, a First Cause. It is legitimate to caU this cause a "first cause" if we
assume (as seems plausible) that all effects are contingent.

The Role of Defeasible Reasoning
Even though we have excellent empirical evidence for the generalization
that wholly contingent situations have causes, it is hard to see how any
amount of data could settle conclusively the question of whether or not
this generalization (Axiom 8) admits of exceptions. The skeptic can always
find a logically consistent position by simply restricting the scope ofaxiom

THE COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT

195

8 in such a way as to exclude its application to the cosmos as a whole.
The most effective response, dialectically speaking, is to insist that, at
the very least, our experience warrants adopting the causal principle as a
default or defeasible rule. This means that, in the absence of evidence to the
contrary, we may infer, about any particular wholly contingent situation,
that it has a cause.
This is, however, all that is needed for the cosmological argument to be
rationally compelling. In place of a deductively valid, apodeictic proof of
the existence of a first cause, the defender of the cosmological argument
can offer instead a defeasible argument (an argument correct by the standards of nonmonotonic reasoning). The burden is then shifted to the
agnostic, who must garner evidence of a positive sort for the proposition
that the cosmos really is an exception to the rule. Merely pointing out the
defeasible nature of the inference (i.e., the bare possibility of the cosmos's
being an exception) does not constitute a cogent rebuttal.
Considerable progress has been made in recent year in developing formal systems of defeasible or nonmonotonic reasoning that satisfy certain
plausible meta-Iogical constraints. For example, in the Commonsense
Entailment system of Asher and Morreau,6 a defeasible version ofAxiom 8
could be expressed by using adefault conditional connective, >:
Axiom 8* Vx(Vx> 3y (y > x))

This version ofAxiom 8 can be read as: normally, a wholly contingent
situation has a cause. This defeasible Axiom 8* will allow us to infer that
any given wholly contingent situation has a cause unless some positive
reason can be given for thinking that the situation in question is an exception to the rule, for example, by showing that the situation belongs to a category of things that typically does not have a cause.
The skeptic could refuse to accept even the defeasible generalization 8*.
Like Kant or Russell, he might insist that the universality of causation be
seen as a canon or prescriptive rule for reason, and not as a descriptive
generalization (even a defeasible one) of mind-independent reality.
However, to give up even the defeasible version ofAxiom 8 as a
descriptive generalization about reality is to embrace a radical form of skepticism. All of our knowledge about the past, in history, law and l1_atural science, depends on our inferring causes of present situations (traces, memories, records). Without the conviction that all (or nearly all) of these have
causes, all of our reconstructions of the past (and therefore, nearly all of our
knowledge of the present) would be groundless. Moreover, our knowledge
of the future and of the probable consequences of our actions depends on
the assumption that the relevant fuhlre states will not occur uncaused. The
price of denying this axiom is very steep: embracing a comprehensive
Pyrrhonian skepticism.

From Oppy's Critique to the Best Rebuttal to the Argument
In his response to my argtlffient, Oppy seems confused about the nature of
defeasible argumentation. To rebut a defeasible argument, it is not sufficient
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merely to point out that one or more of the principles involved admit of
exceptions. This is merely a truism that holds of all defeasible arguments. To
think that this truism constitutes a rebuttal is to be guilty of what is classically known as the "fallacy of Accident". For example, if I know that smokers
generally develop health problems, and that Smith is a smoker, it is reasonable for me to conclude that Smith will develop health problems. Merely
pointing out that some smokers livelong without developing such problen1.s
("My uncle Joe smoked like a chimney and lived to be 95") is entirely irrelevant to the rational cogency of the original argument. Similarly, merely to
point out, as Oppy does, that the Cosmos might be, for all we know, al1.
exception to Axiom 8 is, as arebuttal, a non-starter. We need some special
reason for thinking that the Cosmos in particular is exceptional in this
respect. The burden of proof is squarelyon Oppy's shoulders, and merely
complaining about my supposed "question-begging" and "foot-stomping"
improprieties7 does nothing to discharge this responsibility.
Oppy defines a first event as a situation to which nothing is temporally
prior. Oppy argues that we could replace Axiom 8* with the principle that
every non-first event has a cause (call this Axiom 8NF). Oppy contends that
all the evidence that can be adduced in support ofAxiom 8* can also be
adduced in support of 8NF, so there is no compelling reason for the skeptic
to prefer the first to the second. 8
Oppy admits that his principle might seem to be "slightly less natural'"
than Axiom 8*.~,lwould argue that Oppy's principle is Ü1. fact "slightly less
natural" than~8* in exactly the san1.e way that all emeralds are grue is "slightly less natural" than all emeralds are green. When draWll1.g inductive generalizations, any loss of naturalness, no matter how "slight", can be critical.
In fact, Oppy's restrietion of the universality of causation to non-first
events is a classic case of special pleading, until and unless he can provide
some principled ground for thinking that the absence of temporally prior
situations is relevant to the presence or absence of a cause.
Oppy is confusing defeasible or nonmonotonic reasoning with deductive
reasoning. It is certainly logically consistent to maintain the universality of
causation with the exception of first events, but Oppy has not shown that it
is reasonable to maintain such an exception. If Oppy's only reason for excepting first events from the scope ofAxiom 8 is his distaste of the conclusion
which would otherwise be drawn (viz., the existence of a necessary first
cause), then his position is consistent but unreasonable, just as it would be
unreasonable for me to except the events that occur after January I, 2002. It
would be consistent for me to n1.aintain that all events except those occurring
after January I, 2002 have causes, and my version ofAxiom 8, which we
might call Axiom 8Y2K is supported by exactly the same body of evidence
supporting Axiom 8*, but clearly it would be unreasonable to except those
events without providing some positive reason to think that the temporal
location of an event relative to the turn of the millennium is relevant to its
being caused or uncaused. Similarly, Oppy's restrietion is unreasonable, in
the absence of any reason to think that an event's relative temporallocation
is relevant to its having or lacking a cause.
Can Oppy's objection be redeemed? I think it is possible to find a reasonable rebuttal of my argument that lies somewhere ll1. the neighborhood
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of Oppy's suggestion. I will do my best to develop the most promising
rebuttal to the defeasible version of the cosmological argument, in the
hopes that by doing so, I will contribute to a greater understanding of the
structLlre of a dialectic involving defeasible reasoning.
A cogent rebuttal can be based on making the simple question, Don't
contingent situations typically have contingent causes? This rebuttal is an
instance of a wider strategy: focus on some unique feature of the First
Cause and point out that the cause of the world's having that feature is an
exception to some well-established generalization. Indeed, for the most
part, contingent situations do have contingent causes. They also have causes with finite attributes and causes that can be located in space and time,
features which, in each case, the hypothesized First Cause would lack.
Once we have established that the the cause of the cosmos would be relevantly unusual, we seem to be faced with two equally unattractive options:
supposing that the cosmos has only a very unusual kind of cause, or supposing that it has no cause at all. Thus, we seem to end in astalemate.
We can reconstruct Oppy's objection along these lines. Although.Oppy
offers no defense for his restriction of the scope ofAxiom 8*, there are several defenses that could be mounted. Adefender of Oppy's principle could
perh.aps appeal to Hume's account of the nature of causal priority. If the
causal priority of an event to one of its effects simply consists in its temporal priority to that effect, then we would have very good reason for supposing that first events have no causes, since nothing could be causally
prior to them. However, there are good reasons to resist Hume's account
of the nature of causal priority. First, it excludes the possibility of temporally backwards causation, which seems to be metaphysically possible and
has actually figured in scientific explanations and interpretations of quantum mechanics. Second, the nature of temporal priority is even more
obscure than that of causal priority, and the best accounts of temporal priority seem to be those that presuppose the ontologically prior existence of
causal priority (as I argue in Chapter 4 of Realism Regained).l0
A second line of defense of Oppy's principle would be to point out that
all of the causes with which we are familiar are temporally prior to their
effects. In Realism Regained,ll I provide a number of arguments for thinking that this is mistaken: that we do, in fact, have experience of the causal
efficacy of atemporal situations (such as the situations that support the
holding of certain naturallaws). Moreover, even if this claim were correct
aboLlt our experience, it would fail to support Oppy's principle, since what
we need is a positive reason for thinking that situations that are not temporally related to an event cannot cause it. Merely observing that all of the
causes we are familiar with in experience are temporally prior to their
effects does not support Oppy's principle if our experience is in fact limited
to temporally located situations. We can only observe that situations do
have temporal causes; we cannot observe that they do not have atemporal
causes, but it is the latter observation that would be needed to justify
Oppy's restriction ofAxiom 8*. Consider the following analogy: all the
causes we have so far observed occurred before January 1, 2002, but this
gives us no reason to think that all causes without exception will occur
before this date.
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However, there is a third, more successfulline of defense for Oppy's
principle. All of the situations we have observed have had causes which
were at least in part located in tin1e at a moment earlier than the effect.
Oppy's first events are clearly unusual in this respect: if they have any
causes, these causes cannot be located even in part at a time prior to the
first event.
This third version of a defense of Oppy's principle can be subsumed
under the original objection I mentioned: namely, that all observed cases of
causation are cases in which the cause was contingent. In my 1997 paper, I
argued that necessary (non-contingent) situations cannot be located in
space or time. 12 If I can explain why we must conclude, this fact notwithstanding, that the cosmos has a necessary cause, then I will have also
explained why we must conclude that first events have non-temporal causes, since necessary causes are ipso facto atemporal ones.

My Response to this Rebuttal
In other words, the defender of the cosmological argument must respond
to this sort of rebuttal with substantial reasons for thinking that, although
the First Cause is unique in a number of respects, each of these unique features can be adequately explained by extrapolating from tendencies
already observable in ordinary cases of causation. My own defense of the
argument is based on the following thesis: that, in some precise sense, a
cause is always more nearly necessary (or, equivalently, less profoundly contingent) than its effect.
Relative necessity can be defined by the following:
Definition

a is more nearly necessary than b H

df

\::Ix r;;: b [D(Ax

~

Aa) & O(Aa &

-Ax)]

In other words, a situation a is more necessary than situation b just in case
a is actual in every world in which any part of b is actual, but a could itself

be actual in the absence of the actuality of any part of b. This follows from
the identity conditions of situations. The causes of a situation are essential
to its identity: had the very same truth been verified by a situation caused
in a different way, we would not have had the same situation as verifier.
The corresponding thesis involving effects is not plausible: a situation's
identity does not include the eventuality of all its effects.
This assumption is a generalization of the Kripkean intuition that the
origin of a thing is always essential to it. It is true that in naturallanguage
we sometimes treat event-tokens with slightly different parts and
antecedents as identical. For example, we might say that the death of
Caesar would have been less painful had Brutus not participated.
However, such looseness in natural language should not be taken as settling the metaphysical issue.
This principle (an effect necessitates the existence of its causes) does not
imply that the content or intrinsic type of an effect necessitates the content or
type of its causes. For example, the token situation of Caesar's death could
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not have existed had not all of its causes, including Brutus's knife-thrust,
existed. This of course does not mean that Caesar wouldn't have died
unless Brutus and th.e other senators had killed hirn. The truth 'Caesar
died' would have been verified by a different situation in all of those
worlds in which Brutus does not help in inflicting the fatal set of wounds.
The situation that actually verifies the truth 'Caesar died' would not have
existed had any of its causes failed to exist.
There are several additional reasons for thinking that causes are more
nearly necessary than their effects. First, it is clear that we need some
account of causal priority that explains the transitivity and asymmetry of
this relation. An account of causal priority in terms of relative necessity
nicely satisfies this desideratum.
Second, this account enables us to specify exhaustively the potential causes of a given situation: a is a potential cause of b if and only if a is more
nearly necessary than b. Such a specification is necessary if we are to
account for the statistical properties of causal connections, the so-called
"Markovian principles" developed by Salmon13 and Suppes14 and studied
recently by Pearl and Verma and Spirtes, Glymour and Scheines. 15 I use
these Markovian principles in developing a causal calculus in Appendix B
of Realism Regained. Markov locality entails that the causal antecedents of
an event "screen off" the probability of that event from the probability of
any non-consequent event-token. If we assurne that the probability of
every actual event-token is screened off in this way by its actual causes,
then we are implicitly assuming that the causal antecedents of any actual
token are necessary to its identity, that there are no non-actual or counterfactual causes of actual tokens.
Finally, this principle seems to be implicit in our conviction that the past
is fixed and the future is open. The relative necessity of causally antecedent
tokens gives us an explanation of the asyn1.metry of past and future. The

fixity of the past can best be understood as the relative necessity of past
event-tokens, given the token event corresponding to the present. This thesis is implicit in all "branching-future" models of temporallogic.
The cosmos (as I have defined it) is a situation of absolutely minimal
contingency. If situation a contains situation b as apart, then b is no less
profoundly contingent (no more nearly necessary) than a, since (by Axiom
4) a could not be actual if b were not actual. Since the cosmos contains
every wholly contingent situation as apart, no wholly contingent situation
can be less profoundly contingent than the cosmos.
Since the cosmos is a situation of minimal contingel1.cy, it is not surprising
that it should have no contingent cause, but it would still be very surprising if
it had no cause at all. By extrapolating from our common experience with
causation, we conclude that a situation of minimal contingency (such as the
cosmos) has a non-contingent (necessary) cause. At the same time, the principIe of causal priority as asymmetric necessitation gives us good reason for
concluding that the necessary cause of the cosmos is itself uncaused, since
nothing can be strictly more necessary than an absolutely necessary situation.
These considerations lead to a new version of the critical Axiom 8:
Axiom 8** Vx(Vx >3y(y is more nearly necessary than x & y > x))
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On the basis of induction, we can confirm that, at every degree of necessity
(short of absolute necessity), every token is caused by some token more necessary than it. As we successfully build scientific models that stretch across
astronomical and geological time, we confirm that situation-tokens across a
wide swath of degrees of necessity have causes that are strictly more necessary than themselves. Axiom 8** is the generalization of this pattern (in the
form of a defeasible rule). Axiom 8** states that we may reasonably infer,
about any token at any degree of contingency (short of absolute necessity),
that it has a causal antecedent which is more necessary than it.
We can now give an adequate justification for the restriction of causality
to wholly contingent situations. If we substitute any situation that is not
wholly contingent (that contains at least one necessary part) for x in the
consequent ofAxiom 8**, the result is necessarily false, since there is no situation more necessary th.an an absolutely necessary situation.
Consequently, the generalized defeasible axiom couldn't be true without
the restriction in the antecedent to wholly contingent situations. Any further restriction, along the lines advocated by Oppy, would have to be justified on other grounds.
When we apply Axiom 8** to the Cosmos, or to any other minimally
contingent situation, we succeed in drawing the defeasible conclusion that
it has a cause, and in addition, we have an explanation as to why the cause
of the Cosmos is necessary.

Oppy's Critique ofMy Corollaries
In section 7 of A New Look," I argued for six corollaries of my principal
theorem. Oppy objects to th.e first five of these, primarily on the grounds
that they do not follow deductively from apriori premises. Again, Oppy
misinterprets my intent. I claim that there are defeasible arguments for
each of the corollaries, providing prima facie cases for some tentative conjectures about the first cause. I never claimed that the arguments are a priori: in many cases, they rely upon inductive generalizations from scientific
experience. A cogent rebuttal of these arguments would require introducing some kind of contrary evidence or counter-argument.
I am con.fident that the inferences sketched in this section represent a
natural and proper tendency of the human mind. The Rubicon is crossed
when one accepts the existence of a necessary first cause. I know of no one,
living or dead, who accepted th.e argument for a first cause who did not go
on to embrace the existence of an infinite and immaterial being. Oppy is
no exception.
Our experience supports th.e supposition that each situation involves one
or more particular individuals instantiating one or more properties or relations. Situations are themselves concrete particulars. If a situation s realizes
the situation-type of there existing some F, then there is some particular individual a of such a kind that s realizes the situation-type of a's being F. Barwise
and Perry referred to this feature of situations as their referential transparency.
(For more details, see Chapters 2 and 3 and Appendix A of Realism Regained.)
If a situatioIl is necessary, then the particular individual or individuals
involved in the situation have the property of existing necessarily, as I con11
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clude in Corollary 1.
In Corollary 2, I argue that a collection of necessary beings constitutes
something other than a mere aggregation. Oppy offers sets and nUITlbers
as exceptions. However, such mathen1atical objects form a tightly coherent
system, and so seem to support my conclusion rather than Oppy's. In any
case, Oppy hasn't demonstrated that such abstract objects exist with
absolute necessity. In Chapter 15 of Realism Regained, I take seriously the
possibility that there are asymmetrical necessitation relations among the
nun1bers, with larger numbers necessitating their predecessors, but not
vice versa.
Corollary 3 concerns God's attributes. Oppy finds my somewhat compressed definition of attribute mysterious, so I will try to clarify my meaning. An object has a variety of properties. In some cases, the thing's having
one property, say F, is causally responsible for it's having another property, G. For example, a sampie of salt has the property of being soluble
because of certain physical and chemical properties of its molecules. Thus,
its property of consisting of such molecules is causally responsible for its
property of solubility.
A property F of x is an attribute of x just in case it is a property of x and
there is no property G of x such that x's having G is causally responsible
(even in part) for x's having F. In other words, as I defined the term in
1997, attributes are the causally fundamental properties of a thing.
Let s be the situation that is the first cause, and let God be the mereological sum of all individuals x such that, for some property F, x's being F is
included in s. Each of th.e properties of any such x corresponds to a property
of God, not (as Oppy supposes that Iassume) because every property of
the part is a property of the whole, but because in such cases God always '
has the property of having apart with property F .
Suppose for contradiction that one of God's attributes, say D, is a contingent property of God. This would mean that God's being D is caused by
the first cause, s. This would mean that some other property E of God's
(such that God's having E is included in. s) is causally responsible for God's
having D, contrary to our assumption that D was an attribute of God's.
Hence, God has all of its attributes of necessity.
Iassurne that the attribute of any part corresponds to an attribute of the
whole. I don't mean (as Oppy supposes) that the whole has the very same
property, but that the whole's having apart with its attribute is itself an
attribute of the whole. For example, the causally fundamental properties
of each molecule of a sampie of salt correspond to causally fundamental
properties of the wh.ole sampie, namely, the attribute of being composed of
molecules with those physico-chernical attributes. This quite plausible
principle, in combination with Corollary 3, immediately gives me
Corollary 4, that all of God's parts have their attributes of necessity.
Finally, I argued that all of God's attributes are immeasurable (Corollary
5). Ollr experience with the physical world supports the generalization
that measurable properties are continuous, and that finite, non-zero intensities of continuous properties are contingent. There appear to be exceptions to these generalizations, as in quantum mechanics. However, acceptance of the hypothesis of quantization in physics required considerable

Faith and Philosophy

202

positive evidence to overcome the strong rational presumption in favor of
the possibility of small increases and decreases.
Once again, Oppy insists on reading my argument as a deductive syllogism, assuming that all measurable properties are continuous, an.d that all
continuous properties are contingent. In fact, I claimed only that there is a
strong presumption in favor of contingency in such cases, and Oppy has
offered no reason to override that presumption in the case at hand.
I may have been insufficiently clear about the status of the quantity zero.
I did not intend to include the zero value of an attribute as measurable. In.
fact, infinity and zero are mutually convertible: infinite knowledge corresponds to zero ignorance, and zero knowledge to infinite ignorance. A
necessary situation could well include both zero and infinite values (as values of the attributes of things), since both of these values are metrically isolated. It is only values that are not metrically isolated, values that have
qualitatively similar alternatives arbitrarily close in degree, that are presumably contingent. Consequently, it is easy for me to admit that God
might measure zero on such. scales as ugliness, evil or ignorance.
Oppy argues on page 383 that Corollary 5 leads to the conclusion that
God does not have such attributes as intelligence or power, since these are
measurable. However, an infinite degree of intelligence (like the complete
absence of intelligence) is metrically isolated, in the relevant sense. Any
decrease in intelligence from the infinite to the finite involves a qualitative
change, not an arbitrarily small variation. It is, however, only the latter
that creates the presumption of contingency.
I am not claiming that the cosmological argument by itself provides
grounds for attribLlting intelligence to God, but only that it provides
grounds for expecting that if God has any positive intelligence at all, it is
infinite in degree. In the absence of any contrary consideration, this is the
most reasonable conjecture for us to form.

Skyhooks and Cranes
The cosmological argument is of critical importance to the scientific development of metaphysics. In Darwin's Dangerous Idea,16 Daniel Dennett refers
to a colloquialism of contemporary engineering, the skyhook, defined by the
OEDas:

skyhook orig. Aeronaut. An imaginary contrivance for attachment to
the sky; an imaginary means of suspension in the sky.
To these deus ex machina devices of pseudo-explanation, Dennett contrasts
the real and useful crane, solidly anchored in the reality of material bodies
and their motions. Only materialistic explanations, Dennett claims, can be
genuine explanations, whether we are discussing natural science or metaphysics.
If the cosmological argument is successful, then the playing field
between materialistic and theistic explanations can be levelled. Theistic
explanations are crane-like after all, beginning, as any serious metaphysical explanations must do, with the causally fundamental first cause.
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This re-orientation of n1etaphysics has profound implications for such
projects as accounting for the nature of logical and mathematical truths,
natural necessity and naturallaws, the Big Bang and the anthropic coincidences, the origin of life and of biological information in general, the objectivity of value, and the possibility of human knowledge. In each case, the
success of the cosmological argument enhances significantly the explanatory virtues of theistic hypotheses.
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